Book 2: Discerning and Discovering The Meaning of Holy Scripture
Part 1: Discerning the Meaning of Scripture
Treatise 2
The Meaning of Scripture in Specific
Section 1
The Literal Meaning
In the last treatise, we stated and supported with reasons the fact that Scripture, when considered in general, has two meanings. But now we must discuss each meaning specifically and in particular. And indeed, we must discuss the literal meaning, (1) definitively, by hunting down its nature and definition, (2) distinctively, by setting forth its distinctions, (3) canonically, by considering certain rules and canons.
Article 1
Definition of the Literal Meaning
The definition is both of the terminology and of the thing itself.
Definition of the term:
(1) Among the Hebrews they call the literal meaning the “hearing” (this is the name that pertains most closely to the meaning of the words that are conveyed by the living voice and consequently to the meaning of the words that are written down), then they use the phrase “according to its hearing,” and “as the words sound,” according to the proper and native literal meaning. They also call it the “laying out” and “opening up,” which means the simple, plain and clear explanation, the simple literal meaning. Likewise they call it, in Hebrew, an “example” or “parable,” perhaps for the reason that, according to the Cabbalistic hypothesis, everywhere in the letter of the text there something that is a parable of something else and at the same time contains the Cabbalistic meaning. In relation to the mystical meaning, they call the literal meaning, in Hebrew, a “little thing,” as we said a little earlier.
(2) Among the Greeks, they commonly use (1) the term “nous” (which is a contraction from no-os) and properly means “mind” or “spirit” but has a transferred meaning of “thinking,” “will” or “counsel” and, what looks in this direction, the “meaning of the words,” be they spoken or written. For this reason Aristophanes says, “What is the meaning (nous) of these words?” or what do these words mean to say? Lucian writes, “And perhaps this was the meaning (nous) of what was said.” And Synesius in Letter 103, “But you misunderstood the meaning (nous) of the letter.” 1 Corinthians 2:16 seems to be understood in this sense, “For who has known the mind (nous) of Christ” and soon afterwards, “but we have the mind (nous) of Christ.” Whether by this word, however, we understand God’s plan concerning our salvation or the meaning of the divine Word, it amounts to the same thing, because the plan of God – and that in its entirety – is revealed to us in the Scriptures. Therefore he who searches and understands the Scriptures has the mind (nous) of Christ, that is, he accurately understands the meaning of Christ’s words, and in so doing, he knows exactly what his plan is. It seems clear, however, that we should understand that word to be very close to the “meaning of the words of Scripture” from verse 14, where it says that “the animate man does not perceive those things that are of the Spirit of God,” that is, that he does not understand the Scriptures and the mysteries of the faith that are set out in them, and so he does not grasp their meaning. And verse 15, where it says that “the spiritual man discerns all things,” it follows that we should also understand it to be about the true and salutary understanding of the Scriptures. (2) The word “dianoia” also occurs, which we discussed at the beginning of the book, in section 1. The term “spoken word,” is also commonly employed, which theologians are accustomed to using for this meaning, although we should understand this term more strictly than the phrase “literal meaning,” as we will explain.
(3) The Latin terminology, “literal meaning,” is a synechdoche, from the “letter,” which is the first element of forming a word. For just as by the augmentation of synechdoche, the letter is taken to mean the entire speech (given orally or written), whereby the liberal arts programs themselves are usually called “good letters” or “noble letters,” so also by the same device of synechdoche we call the “literal meaning” that which the speaker or writer most closely intends and envisions, as we will state soon at greater length. There is also the common term “historical meaning,” but that is overly strict and narrow, since it only pertains to that part of holy Scripture that contains the historical accounts. The literal meaning, on the other hand, is found in all of Scripture, whether it is historical, dognatic or prophetic.
Definition of the thing:
There is some disagreement among authors concerning the nature and definition of the literal meaning of holy Scripture, but a friendly truce over a distinction may easily resolve the problem.
(1) Some define the literal meaning as “that which is drawn from the words of Scripture when they are understood properly and without any trope,” or that which the words properly reveal. They understand the literal meaning as a distinct classification that is separate from the tropological or figurative meaning (which the words in the text beget when they are transferredly and tropologically understood), and use a separate generic term for each of them (the literal and figurative), as if each represents a distinct category. They call the first the “grammatical meaning”. (At times, however, this seems to be somewhat inappropriate, on the one hand because this category is plainly at odds with another classification with which it ought to agree – because the tropological or figurative meaning pertains to the rhetoric, from which the grammar is divided, as if it were its own discipline – on the other hand because both terms, the “grammatical” and the “literal meaning” on the whole seem to be equally as acceptible, because the Greek word “gramma” means “letter” and so “grammatical” means “literal”. But we need not fight so stubbornly over the names for things.)
And some people seem to take their queue for thinking this way from the Church Fathers. For Jerome mentions this in his commentary on Isaiah, on the same passage (ch. 2 Esa.), “The wolf shall dwell with the lamb,” which he says is false according to the litteral meaning. Gregory in book 4 of the Moralia (ch. 1 & 2) quotes that passage of Job 3:3, “May the day perish on which I was born,” which he says is absurd, if understood literally. Augustine in book 3 of De Doctrina Christiana (ch. 5) says, “You must be careful not to mistake the figurative meaning for the literal. For what the apostle says pertains to this – The letter kills but the Spirit makes alive.” Nicholas of Lyra (in 3. prol. Bibl.) likewise denies the literal meaning in those passages where a metaphor occurs. Bellarmine also seems to ascribe to this opinion, with Whitaker (de Script. quaest. 5.c.2.), Morton (part. 2. apol. Cathol. lib. 5. ch. 1) and several others, when in De Verbo Dei (book 3, ch. 3. §. 2) he gives this description of the literal meaning, that it is “what the words immediately convey.” But in sections 4 and 9 (where he divides the literal meaning into simple and figurative categories), he satisfactorily explains what he wrote, which is that by the word “immediately,” he does not mean “altogether without mediation,” considered absolutely with respect to the word or sentence, but “within limits”, considered according to the reasoning behind the word or sentence as it appears in the passage of Scripture.
As things are, however, this first opinion concerning the literal meaning, simply and absolultely speaking, seems unable to stand up to scrutiny. For no one can doubt that the literal meaning of Scripture is also the meaning of the Holy Spirit, who speaks to us in the Scriptures. But if the literal meaning is that which we take from the words when they are properly received, and that is truly the meaning of Scripture itself and of the Holy Spirit, it follows that Herod is properly speaking a fox. For it says so in Luke 13:31. It follows that our hands and feet, if they cause us to sin, should be cut off and our eyes dug out, as in Matthew 5:29-30. It follows that holy men, properly speaking, ought to walk on snakes and scorpions, and trample on lions and snakes, as in Psalm 91:13. That the wolves will, properly in the New Testament, dwell with lambs, and panthers with goats, according to the prophecy of Isaiah 11:6-8; 65:25. But all these things are ridiculous and absurd. Therefore so is that premise from which these are logical deductions. The logic of the sequence is obvious, because we gather the meaning of the sayings that we quoted from the proper context of the speech. This meaning, however, according to this hypothesis, is the literal one, and the meaning of Scripture itself, and consequently the meaning of the Holy Spirit. If you were to retort that we should abandon this literal meaning (if it contains absurd things and subsequently conflicts with articles of faith) and embrace the figurative meaning, I reply “yes, by all means,” if by this you mean that it should not be called the literal meaning. For now we are talking about the meaning of passages of Scripture. The meaning of passages of Scripture, however, is simply that which Scripture (or the Holy Spirit in Scripture) means. Yes, therefore; if Scripture clearly does not mean the same as what we would learn from what they call the literal meaning, and consequently should not be called the meaning of any passage or text.
(2) Others define the literal meaning of Scripture as “what the Holy Spirit most closely intends,” and this meaning is drawn directly from the words, according to the goal of the speaker, the logical coherence and the ananolgy of Scripture, whether those words are proper and free from tropes or whether they are affected by tropes.
On this topic, the words of the illustrious Professor Hunnius please us, in Contra Paracelsum (& Weigel. ch. 2. §. 35), who says, “We do not define the letter as the first direct meaning of the words and phrases as they are gramatically received, but the meaning that the words, insofar as they are employed in the text, are of themselves primarily able to convey. For the literal meaning is like this in Isaiah 11:6. “The wolf will dwell with the lamb” does not speak of a union of beasts, but of the Jews and gentiles.”
Some people put it like this, “There is always and in every place one literal meaning of passages of Scripture, but there are two ways of signifying that meaning; one is proper and the other is improper.”
Nicholas of Lyra in his prologue to the Bible has this to say concerning the matter, “We look for the literal meaning of holy Scripture, that which is intended by the author of holy Scripture, who is God. There is a reason for this; for the literal meaning of any given passage of Scripture is that which the author intends, since words are signs of those passions that are in the soul, as in the first chapter of On Interpretation. But it follows that the author of holy Scripture is God, and thus it is obvious that the literal meaning, which we are now discussing, is that which is intended by God and is signified through the words contained in the letters.” And on Jeremiah 31, over the words “They will gather unto the goods of the Lord, over the grain and the oil,” and so on, he says, “By these things, parabolically, we understand spiritual goods, which are only received by men under the likeness of bodily goods. Because of this, Scripture in the Old and New Testaments frequently speaks parabolically” (metaphorically) “and there the literal meaning is not that which is signified directly by the words, but that which is understood according to the things signified.” And at the end of his commentary on Ezechiel he writes, “The visions of buildings that Ezechiel relates are commonly understood metaphorically, and therefore the process of explaining visions like this according to their mystical meaning ought to be considered proper and literal, according to the prophet’s own way of speaking, just as in those passages that are spoken parabolically, the literal meaning is not that which is signified according to the letter, but that which is understood according to those things that the letter signifies.”
(3) (Verdict.) For our part, we think that we should proceed like this:
1. The term “literal meaning” is taken either strictly and improperly, or in a wider sense and properly. Thus, when spoken of strictly, the literal meaning can be called that which we described in the first instance, which is gathered from what the words obviously and directly signify. Thus, the literal meaning of the passage, “You will walk on the snake and the scorpion” would be said to be that which can arise from the words when properly understood, so that “snake” would be understood to be a certain poisonous animal, as would “scorpion.” “To walk” would signify a moving by means of the feet over something and trampling it. We must note, however, that when the speech is understood this way, we should call it the “literal meaning of the words considered in themselves” rather that the “literal meaning of Scripture”, whether of the scriptural passages and texts themselves or of the words insofar as they are situated or arranged in the biblical text.
Some say that the meaning that consists in the proper signification of a word that is taken metaphorically is not literal, but only grammatical and only contains the outer shell of the letter, but does not arrive at the thought of the writer. If we understand the literal meaning more broadly and properly, it is that which we described in the second instance, namely, that which fits with the intention of the Holy Spirit, and the context, and the analogy of Scripture. And thus the literal meaning is also in those passages that we are supposed to take figuratively.
In this way, the literal meaning of the passage, “You will walk on the snake and the scorpion” is as follows: In any of the greatest dangers and disasters, you will be untouched and safe. For this is what the Holy Spirit intends in this passage, as its very connection to the context makes clear.
2. We must distinguish between the terms customarily used by theologians, namely, between the “literal meaning” and the “spoken word”. For although they are at times used with the same force, accurately speaking, however, the former term is in contrast to the mystical meaning of Scripture, and is – as I said – that which the Holy Spirit most closely intends in the scriptural words and passages. The latter term, “spoken word,” is in contrast to the “thought,” as they say, namely when the word or speech, if it contains some manifest absurdity (but not clear and apparent to our reason) when we take it properly, or if it conflicts with the analogy of Scripture when we take it figuratively and as a trope, and we need to look for a congruous (as they say) “thought”. In this way, because the words, “You will walk on the snake and the scorpion,” and so on, according to their proper meaning, do not agree with what is holy, therefore when the “spoken word,” or that meaning which the words properly signify, is rejected, then the metaphorical (or rather, the allegorical, which is a sustained metaphor) should be embraced, as we said before.
Therefore those two terms are different; one is wider, the other narrower. Every spoken word is the literal meaning, but not contrariwise is every literal meaning the spoken word.
Or we can put it like this: Whatever ought to be explained according to the spoken word and without a trope is the literal meaning, intended by the Holy Spirit. But the opposite is not the case, that whatever agrees with the literal meaning, intended by the Holy Spirit, should be explained properly and without a trope.
Article 2
Distinction: Proper and Figurative Literal Meaning
From what we have said, a distinction for the literal meaning flows naturally, so that it hardly needs to be repeated. The literal meaning is that which the Holy Spirit or Christ most closely intends when he speaks in the Scriptures.
It is either a proper meaning or a figurative meaning. For since the words of each passage or text should be taken either properly or improperly, it is necessary that the literal meaning also be twofold.
The proper literal meaning is that which arises from the words when they are taken according to their proper, native signification. Thus in the words of the Lord’s Supper, “Take and eat. This is my body”, the literal meaning is proper, because there is no word here that is modified or affected by a trope. “To take” means taking, properly understood, which happens by mouth or by hand. “To eat” means a proper eating, which happens by mouth. “This” properly signifies that which was offered by Christ to the apostles to be eaten. “Is” properly signifies the connection of the subject with the predicate, and the expression of the substance of the Eucharistic Sacrament. “Body” properly signifies the very body of the Lord, subsisting in the hypostasis of the most glorious Word. “My” properly has a pronominal meaning. The figurative literal meaning is that which words produce when we understand them in a modified way according to a trope, both when some trope occurs in a passage or text of Scripture that are explaining, and when an appropriate and congruent “thought” is said to be looked for in the text, the proper literal meaning of which is said to be considered “the spoken word”. In this way, when in John 6 Christ preaches about “eating the bread of life”, the literal meaning involves a trope. For neither “bread” is said properly, but as the life-giving flesh of Christ, which is called bread metaphorically, nor is “eating” said properly, according to what is done with the mouth of the body, but it is spiritual and acquired by a faithful heart or, what is the same, faith itself in Christ is understood. We can abundantly prove either meaning in view of Christ, by connection to the context and by the analogy of Scripture, which we treat at greater length elsewhere.
Article 3
General Canons for the Literal Meaning
Rules and canons concerning the literal meaning, needful for interpreting Scripture, may be distinguished so that some are general, some are particular. The former speak concerning the literal meaning in itself. The latter speak with respect to the above-made distinction concerning the literal meaning, as it is proper and figurative. Here we produce the canons of the first category.
Canon 1
We must not consider the literal meaning of scriptural texts to be of little importance, but we must hold it to be of greatest worth, and solicitously search it out.
This canon is opposed to the interpolators of the Theophrasus-Weigelian Vainspeaking. In general, they reject the literal meaning of Scripture and do not hesitate to import only spiritual (as they call them) meanings and whatever else they whimsically invent. Therefore they claim that the literal meaning comes out of the Old Man, from the natural spirit of the world and from the Antichrist. Weigel (dial. p. 81. libell. disp. p. 29, 30. Postill. part. 2. p. 343) writes that it is “a far greater cause of stumbling and destruction than of agreement, and therefore it should be shunned by Christians.” The same author (Postill. part. 3. p. 85) describes it as a “husk that does not penetrate to the inner parts”. And they contemptuously call those who insist on the literal meaning “literalists,” “literalist teachers” and “servants of the letter.” (Weigel Postill. part 2, p.34, 199, 225, 226, 233. Gulden Grieff p. 55, 56. See D. Thummius contra Theol. Weigel. err. 12. sqq.).
Against these, we posit: (1) that which was spoken by Peter (2 Peter 1:20), that Scripture is not the product of anyone’s own interpretation. Certainly, therefore, a mystical interpretation of Scripture must not be imported wherever we want, but the true, genuine meaning must be unearthed from Scripture itself. (2) the clear command of Christ, “search the Scriptures” (John 5:39). Paul says something that agrees with this in 1 Tim 4:13, “devote yourselves to the reading.” These incentives set us on fire not for vain thoughts that are outside of and beyond Scripture (and its explanation), nor for any kind of sweet dreams, but for the careful scrutiny of the texts themselves as the letters present them. For there is no doubt that the Holy Spirit, who is the most faithful teacher of the Church, wanted those things that he wrote to be understood in such a way as the text itself sounds, when it is considered according to the goal of the speaker, the congruity of what comes before and after, and according to the harmony and analogy of Scripture. As a result, it is in no way necessary to take refuge in mystical meanings that are figmented on a whim and imported into Scripture.
Canon 2
There is only one literal meaning of any given word or biblical context.
This canon is opposed to certain Calvinists, but also (and especially) to the pontifical writers.
(1) Certain Calvinists think that, in the words of the Lord’s Supper, Christ’s commanding word, “eat,” has a double meaning and signification, the one to denote an eating by the mouth, but the other to denote a spiritual eating. In this way, it signifies both the eating and the believing; the eating because of the Eucharistic bread, and the believing because of the body of the Lord. So Goclenius writes (in part. 1. miscell. p.111). Others write similar things (Consid. commonefact. p.220. BVCANVS loc. 48).
The first part of this canon opposes this opinion directly: there is only one literal meaning for one word. Understand, however, “one word” rightly, that is, when it is located in simple speech, as is the Eucharistic speech about which we are enquiring. For in a compound speech or proclamation, it is reasonable that the one word (which, however, bears the force of two words), by virtue of its double subject, also sustains a double meaning or signification, as with the verb in Joel 2:13, “Rend your heart and not your garments.” Here the compound speech is divided and resolved into the following two sentences, “Rend your heart: Do not rend your garments.” Therefore the word “rend”, though it is certainly uttered only once, nevertheless has the power of two words. Therefore it is perfectly consistent that the word bear a twofold signification, in view of the two different subjects. The primary signification is proper, concerning the garments; the secondary is metaphorical, concerning the heart, which is said to be rent when it is aware of its sins and the anger of God, and becomes troubled and contrite. Alsted writes well (in lib. 2. praecog. Theol. c. 100), “Holy Scripture is not ambiguous, but whatever word and phrase that is in the same sentence and in the same construction and in one and the same passage has only one signification and one meaning, not many. For a true proclamation is only there when we say one thing. On the other hand, we do not say one thing when a twofold signification is attached to the same word or phrase in the same passage.” And this rightly opposes the pontifical writers, who invent the notion that the word “do,” in the words of the Lord’s Supper, primarily means “sacrifice” or “offer to God,” and secondarily means receive the bread and body of Christ. On this see many places in Dr. Gerhard’s (tom. 5. de Coena, ch. 16. §. 180) and Dr. Meisner (Sobr. Philos. part. 1. sect. 1. ch. 5. q. 6).
(2) Pontifical writers, almost unanimously (with the exception of Michael Medina, lib. 6. of De Recta in Deum Fide ch. 25, who thinks differently. In this he follows—as Gillius mentions in Jes. lib. 1. tract. 7. ch.4, n.1—Alensis 1.p.quaest. 1.n.4. 1 2. ad ultimum, Albert tract. 1. sum. quaest. 5.m.2. ad quintum, and Henry in sum. art. 16. q. 2. ad secundum, et q. 3) all insist that there are sometimes many literal meanings for one passage or text of Scripture.
Azora writes (inst. moral. lib. 8.c.2.§. undecimo quaeritur etc.), “This is the scholarly consensus among theologians, that there can be multiple literal meanings for the same letter.” Bellarmine writes (De Verbo Dei, book 3, ch.3. §.7), “It is not unlikely that, from time to time, many literal meanings be found in the same sentence.” We read similar things in Thomas (1. part. q.1. art.10), Nicholas of Lyra (prol. 2. super Bibl.), Cornelius a Lapide (in praef. super Pentat. can. 35), Hector Pintus (in Esa. 53), Riebera (comm. in Hebr. c.1. num.27), Gretser (in defers. Bellarmine, De Verbo Dei, book 3, ch. 3. col. 1196) and Becanus (part. 2. Theol. Schol. tom. 2. tract. 1.c.3. q.3), who in this matter is somewhat more moderate than the rest. For not only does he speak, concerning the examples of Scripture that the pontifical writers present in support of a plurality of literal meanings, like this: that there seem to be many meanings in those places because they think that they have a double meaning, but he also proposes that certain examples should be noted, which especially work to refute the pontifical writers. For this same purpose, we will briefly describe his writing. “Let us make no mistake,”
Becanus says, “Some things should be noted: (1) That so far, the Church has not resolved that there are many literal meanings under the same letter.” By “Church” he understands a council that the Pope has approved. Here he openly concedes the freedom to establish such a statute, although this teaching, concerning the plurality of the literal meaning of passages of Scripture, has not been set forth and defined. “(2) That there are many instances in Scripture where the ancient Church Fathers interpreted them in different ways according to the letter, but it does not thereby follow that there are many literal meanings in those instances. For it often happens that those many literal meanings that different people attribute to the text contradict each other. It cannot be the case, however, that the Holy Spirit participates in this contradiction.” We will make use of this observation later on. “(3) That although there are many examples of passages that are translated from the Hebrew text in different ways, it does not thereby follow that there are many literal meanings in the same letter, but only that there are many literal meanings according to the different translations of the same passage. (4) That among the ancient Church Fathers, there is scarecely anyone, other than Augustine,” (Confessions 12, ch. 30, 31) “who expressly affirmed that multiple literal meanings are contained under the same words. Certainly they recognise multiple meanins, but that one is literal and the other is mystical.” Thus read Becanus’ hypotheses, from which we may unambiguously gather and understand that he himself doubted whether the common opinion of the Pontifical writers was true.
In opposition to the opinion of the Pontifical writers, however, is the latter part of this Canon: that there is only one literal meaning of any Scriptural passage or context. This thesis must be divided into two parts. In one, we shall confirm the thesis; in the other, we shall untangle it from the opposing arguments of its assailants, then strike back.
1. Confirmation of the thesis.
The following arguments confirm the thesis:
(1) The nature of meaning and signification. There can only be one essential form for only one thing. But the literal meaning or signification is the form of the words that were entered into the Scriptures. There can be only one literal meaning, therefore, of the words entered into the Scriptures, or (what is the same) of the words and passages of holy Scripture.
(2) The unity of truth. There cannot be more than one truth in one and the same sentence, because “true” and “one” are interchangeable. But God’s highest truth is already set forth in the words and sentences of holy Scripture (Psalm 119:142 and John 17:17). Therefore, in the words and sentences of holy Scripture, there cannot be more than one truth. There would, however, be more than one truth, or many truths would be contained in the same word or text, if many literal senses existed in them.
(3) The clarity of holy Scripture. Whatever allows for various literal meanings is in and of itself obscure. But holy Scripture is not in and of itself obscure. Therefore Scripture does not allow for various literal meanings and various significations. Indeed, the Pontifical writers teach that the premise here is false, but it can be firmly established by the clearest statements of Scripture itself (which testifies about itself). See Psalm 19:9, 119:105, Proverbs 6:23, 2 Cor 4:3-4, and 2 Peter 1:19, the emphasis of which we explain elsewhere.
(4) The certainty of holy Scripture (2 Peter 1:19). A steadfastness or firmness is attributed to prophetic Scripture (as also to apostolic Scripture, which is in complete agreement with it, Acts 26:22). But this steadfastness and certainty can in no way coexist with a plurality of literal meanings in one and the same passage of Scripture. For whatever agrees with multiple (more than one) meanings and significations is ambiguous and whatever is ambiguous is uncertain and bears no finite meaning, as the philosopher [Thomas] testifies (De coelo [et mundo] book 1, ch. 2). The pontifical writer Medina also makes use of this argument (in the aforementioned place).
(5) The goal of holy Scripture. If the holy Scriptures are supposed to make us wise, to build us up and shape us, it follows that there should be no ambiguity in them at all, and consequently no variety of literal meanings. The first part is most certainly true, therefore so is what follows. The connection between premise and conclusion is certain, because firm statements that are given many meanings and significations at one and the same time are most certainly ambiguous. Can these ambiguous statements, however, in any way make someone wise, or build them up (especially in that perfect way that is meant by 2 Tim. 3:16-17)? No, but they are so far removed from being able to make men wise that instead they provide the opportunity and substance for errors, as it is said, “Equivocation is always the mother of errors.” The premise is firmly proven from 2 Timothy 3:15-17, John 20:31 and other passages.
2. Disproval of the Antithesis.
So far we have confirmed the orthodox opinion. It remains for us to shed light on and do away with those arguments that are presented by our opponents. They oppose us, however, both with some petty rational arguments and with examples from Scripture. Their rational arguments are drawn from:
(1) The author of Scripture.
Cornelius a Lapide writes (in ch. 2. Eph. p. 517), “The author of the Scriptures, just as he has the fullest possible measure of intelligence and understanding, likewise also has the fullest possible way of speaking. Therefore he intends various meanings, even literal meanings, if they agree with the situation and the passage,” etc. Becanus writes (in the aforemention passage), “God, who is the author of Scripture, is so fruitful that with the one word of his mind he produced infinite things at the same time. He is also able, therefore, to signify many things by one written word.” Gordon Huntlaeus writes (in controv. epit. contr. 1, ch. 15, §. 5), “Since the literal meaning is that which the author intends, but the author of holy Scripture is properly and chiefly God himself, whose intention and mind is not bound only to one truth (as the understanding of man is), but fully understands all things at the same moment in time, there is no doubt that God is able, by the same words and at the same time, to signify different things for us.”
We reply: (1) Just as, in their articles of faith outside of and apart from the will of God as it is expressed in the Scriptures, the pontifical writers take their proofs from the “omnipotence of God” and in this way, “since, wherever they direct the little vessel of their assertion by the rope of holy Scriptures, they do not happen upon a shore of any stability, carried by the waves, they are swept out to that sea of God’s omnipotence.” These are the words of Humbert the bishop of Silva Candida (in disp. adv. Graecos). In like manner, in order to affirm the story about the Translation of the House of Loreto, Baronius (tom I. histor. ann. 9) took refuge in the asylum of God’s omnipotence, saying, “It is not that anyone doubts the historical event, if he remembers what the angel said, that no word is impossible before God.” It is clearly the same for the doctrine of transubstantiation and so on. They proceed in like manner also when dealing with the foundation – namely, holy Scripture – of articles of faith, so that they judge, concerning its meaning and decree, that they derive not from God’s will, but from his power. For from the words of the Jesuits Becanus and Gordon, we can only deduce that “God can bring it about” that there be many literal meanings of the one Scripture. But here, at any rate, that saying rings particularly true: “There is no logical connection between potential and actual.” We must, therefore, go beyond God’s power and on to his will, and inquire into whether God is not only completely able (which we affirm), but also willing. What God wills, however, when he declares his Word, is something we must learn from the Word itself. But Truth itself already teaches that God speaks to us through Scripture in such a way that we can draw, as it were, from the clear, steadfast Word, a meaning that is certain concerning his will and concerning the way to eternal salvation. This can hardly coexist with that variety of literal meanings, which introduces ambiguity.
(2) The Jesuits make their argument, mistakenly, not only from God’s power, but also from his omniscience and intelligence. What is their logic? It is that God understands many things at the same time, therefore he also intends multiple meanings in one word or passage of Scripture. They are mistaken because the meaning of any given speech, whether it is given orally or written down, does not proceed from the speaker’s intelligence without consideration of outside factors, but when it is applied to a specific situation and material, which the words convey and of which there can only be one for each word and sentence. Thus, man is able in his mind to conceive of many things at the same time. Meanwhile, however, if in some specific work he expresses the ideas of his mind in orally-delivered words or in writing, then the meaning is already limited to that one thing. In the same way, God (if we may put together the great and the small), even if he is thinking of infinite things at the same time, nevertheless intends only one simple literal meaning for each word.
(3) If we put the Jesuits’ statements together, two absurdities follow: 1. Since God expresses in one word of his mind infinite things at the same time (as Becanus says), it follows that also with one word that is expressed aurally or in writing, he expresses infinite meanings, since the Jesuits construct their argument and analogy from the former to the latter. The logical conclusion is ridiculous. 2. It would also follow that, in absolutely every statement of Scripture, many – no, unlimited – literal meanings are found. The reasoning is that all statements of Scripture have God for their author, therefore there will be a similar constitution and a parallel formation for all of them. But the Pontifical writers themselves recognise that this conclusion, though it is drawn from their own writings, is false, since they can only muster a few Scriptural examples, in which they say there are many literal meanings. (4) Are the Jesuits also willing to make the following conclusion: “God is the author of Scripture. Scripture, therefore, is obscure and difficult to understand.”? This conclusion certainly emerges from the above discussion, since (as we proved above) a plurality of meanings in Scripture directly infers an accompanying ambiguity and thereby also obscurity. But the apostle argues in a very different – no, contrary – way in 2 Timothy 3:15-17, that “Scripture is inspired by God”. Therefore, it is able to make us wise and “provide us as perfect for every good work.” (5) We overturn, therefore, their entire argument and thus conclude: “Scripture has God for its author. Therefore it does not have many literal meanings.” The reasoning is that God, the maker of mind and tongue, speaks clearly. Therefore he also speaks without ambiguity, which is diametrically opposed to perspicuity. God is truth itself, and the Word is his truth (John 17:17). Therefore he also intends only one truth by one word, since there cannot be more than one truth.
(2) The variety of interpreters.
That there are many literal meanings in the passage of Isaiah 53:8, “his generation, who will tell”, and so on (which we will discuss later), Salmeron (tom. 1. prol. 8. p.81) proves, like this: “Jerome explains this passage as concerning the eternal generation of the Son, and for that reason Nicholas of Lyra found fault with him. Tertullian (Contra Iud. book 2), Lactantius (Institutiones IV.18), and Justin, (Dialogue with Trypho tom. 2) point to Christ’s temporal birth. There are some who apply the same passage to the state of the resurrection. Others are to be found who understand the prophet’s axiom to concern the passive generation of Christ, so that the meaning is: ‘Who can count his spiritual sons and daughters, whom he will beget by the merit of his passion?’ So says Nicholas of Lyra. Finally there are those who think that by ‘generation’, we signify someone’s deeds and actions, in this sense: ‘His generation, who will tell?’ that is, ‘Who would be able, with human mouth or speech, to say everything about his birth, the course of his life, his most holy ways, his miracles, all his deeds, his doctrine, his ability to dispute, his death and resurrection?’ ” So Salmeron writes.
Becanus, who assigns a twofold literal meaning to this prophetic utterance, adds the determination made by the Roman Pope Leo, who (in sermon 3 on the Nativity of our Lord ch. 1) speaks like this, “For we believe that the saying “His generation who will tell?” pertains not only to that mystery by which the Son of God is coeternal with the Father, but also to this beginning, by which the Word was made flesh.” And from the variety of interpretations that are given for the passage of Ephesians 3:18, Cornelius a Lapide (in vestibulo rationis 1) also summarized that there were many literal meanings for the one passage.
Gillius (book 1, tract. 7. ch. 4. num. 8), however, gives this reason for why different explanations of Church Fathers establish multiple literal meanings, “Since, by the decree of the Church, we hold that the Scriptures are interpreted according to the common explanation of the Church Fathers, we should find nothing false in that explanation, or else the Church would be mistaken in its decreeing that we accept their interpretations.” This, to be sure, is that Helen, for whose sake there is so much fighting in the pontifical church.
But we reply: (1) Becanus himself, whose words we presented above, expressly rejects and disproves that reason. Let the Jesuit Fathers, therefore, get together and agree among themselves before they present this argument to us. (2) That diversity of opinions concerning one and the same Scriptural text infers nothing other than this, that the interpreters tried in different ways to uncover the one literal meaning of the words of Scripture. Concerning interpretations, however, that have disagreements with each other (even if they are not contradictory or foreign to the analogy of faith), we must make our decision from Scripture itself, considering the goal of the passage, the context, the diction, and so on, and see which is to be preferred to the others, and which of them more accurately sets forth that one meaning that is intended by the Holy Spirit. (3) How can the Pontifical writers be certain that the author himself intended all those meanings that the different interpretations of Church Fathers set forth? For they have no prophetic or apostolic authority, so that we would, without any doubt, have to consider what they say in their interpretation of passages of Scripture to have been spoken by God. Becanus, from the ancient Church Fathers, attributes only a twofold meaning to the speech in Isaiah 53:8, while Salmeron attributes to it a fivefold meaning. But how can we be certain whose opinion is more correct? If the meaning of that Scripture passage is twofold, certainly the Holy Spirit intended only two meanings, but if fivefold, then he intended five. And the meaning (the form of the words) of Scripture itself will depend on men, will it not? The Jesuit Acosta (lib. 3. de Christi revelat. ch. 11) declares just the opposite, “For the Church has not been able to add a literal meaning to Scripture, which it did not have up to that point.” From this it is clear that any arguments that they make, for a variety of literal meaning based on the authority of Church Fathers, are unclear. This comes as no surprise, since it is the uncertainty and obscurity of holy Scripture that the Pontifical writers are busy trying to draw out from this muddy stream.
They present the following examples from Scripture:
(1) Genesis 1:1, “In the beginning God created the heaven and the earth.” Gretser (in defence of Bellarmine’s De Verbo Dei, book 3, ch. 3) gives these literal meanings from Augustine: “In the beginning, that is, in the Son, his eternal Wisdom.” Likewise, “In the beginning, that is, before anything else had been made, that is, at the beginning of God’s work.” And Augustine in book 12 of his Confessions adds this, “When someone says ‘Moses means what I mean,’ and someone else says ‘no, he means what I mean,’ I think that I say more thoughtfully, ‘Why not rather both, if both are true? And if anyone sees some third, some fourth, and any other truth at all in these words, why would we not believe that he saw all these things, through whom the one God forged the sacred letters with many meanings for those who would see the different truths.’” We reply that it is very clear what the meaning of the first word of the Bible is, namely, that the beginning of time and created things is understood, as it says in John 1:1, “in the beginning”. Therefore (1) the explanation about the God the Son comes from certain Church Fathers, and not from Scripture itself. (2) The second and third meaning are the same, as is self-evident. (3) We are by no means here bound by the authority of Augustine.
(2) Exodus 12:46. According to the letter, this verse concerns the Paschal lamb, as everyone agrees. Also literally, it concerns Christ, because John 19:36 says, “These things were done so that Scripture might be fulfilled.” Scripture, however, is never fulfilled unless it is in the literal meaning. So Tostatus writes (in comm. 2 Sam. 7). We reply that John 19 is in no way appointed to the literal meaning – that there are rituals about not breaking the lamb at Passover – but to the mystical meaning. It frequently happens that a Scripture passage of the Old Testament is appointed to a mystical meaning in the New, and things that were typological are referred to their antitype. See Matthew 2:15. And Scripture is said to be fulfilled at the completion of that which the Holy Spirit intends in Scripture itself, either literally in the words or mysically in the matters at hand.
(3) 1 Chronicles 17:13. “I will become a father to him, and he will become a son to me.” Nicholas of Lyra (prol. 2. super. Bibl.) and Tostatus (super 2 Sam. 7) were of the opinion that these words concerned both Solomon and Christ.
In our response, so that the true meaning of that divine promise (described in 2 Sam. 7:12 and 1 Chron. 17:11 and following) may be clear, and so that we give a full response to this subject, we will briefly discuss two things: (A) I will prove that the promise in question concerns both Solomon, the son of David, and the Messiah. (B) I will explain by what meaning that passage concerns each of them.
(A) It is most abundantly clear that the passage for our consideration concerns Solomon, the son of David: (1) From the explanation given by David and Solomon – indeed, by God himself. David best understood the meaning of all the words of the Lord (since he was a prophet, as Acts 2:30 says). But he refers these very words to his own son Solomon in 1 Chronicles 22:9-10, and 28:2-6. Solomon himself assumes them for himself in 1 Kings 5:5, 8:17-20, and 2 Chronicles 6:7-10. Indeed, God himself refers to these words in 1 Kings 9:5 and 2 Chronicles 7:18. The textual evidence and the verbal similarities clearly prove that all these passages line up with the promise. (2) From consideration of the passage itself, and certainly (1) the goal of the passage. This is gathered from what went before, which is the building of the Temple in Jerusalem. David planned in his heart on doing that himself in 2 Sam 7:2. God through Nathan refused him permission in verses 4-5 (the reason for which is clear from 1 Chron 22:8-10) and he claimed it and reserved it for Solomon, the king’s successor. We can put the two together like this. David’s proposal concerned the building of someone’s Temple; and God’s reply concerned the building of the same someone’s Temple, because of the immediate connection and mutual relation between the question and the reply. But David’s proposal concerned the Temple in Jerusalem. Therefore [so did God’s reply]. (2) the promissed king. The speech concerns the sort of king who (1) is able to sin, as 2 Sam 7:14 says, (2) is rebuked for sins by the rods of men, that is, by man’s reproach. Each of these applies to Solomon rather than anyone else, even the Messiah himself. Moreover, it is clear that we should understand this prophecy to be not only about Solomon (as we have proven so far), but also about Christ, because of: (1) the light of the New Testament, including the clear testimony of Hebrews 1:5, which applies to Christ those words of the promise, “I will become a father to him, and he will become a son to me,” as well as the comparable way of speaking in Acts 2:30, where David, in view of that promise, is said in passing to have prophesied concerning the resurrection of Christ (in Psalm 16:10). This is quite clear in Acts 2:30-31. Compare this also to the words of the angel in Luke 1:32-33. (2) other passages of the Old Testament, which adopt the words of this blessing and describe the kingdom and blessings of Christ, such as Isaiah 9:6-7, Jeremiah 23:5 and 32:15-16, Daniel 7:13-14, Psalm 72:7-8 and Zechariah 6:12-13. The faithful and unchanging mercies of David in Isaiah 55:3 pertain to this, namely, to the coming Messiah, about whom verses 1, 2, 4 and 5 of the same chapter are clearly and plainly concerned. We should also note that these words are used to affirm the resurrection of Christ in Acts 13:34: “But since he has raised him from the dead, he says that he will never return to decay, like this: “For I will give to you the trustworthy benefactions of David,”” or those most certain blessings of David, that is, the things promised to David concerning the Son who would reign forever. In order to fulfill this, Christ needed to rise from the dead and enter into his glory.
(B) Accepting these things, we now ask by what meaning this promise concerns Solomon, and by what meaning it concerns Christ. (1) Nicholas of Lyra is of the opinion that the literal meaning concerns both, but he is wrong. For the case is clear that the words should be understood to be immediately about Solomon. Nor is the meaning of the literal sense, for the reasons I mentioned earlier, able to consist of those two parts. (2) Others argue that the literal meaning of this passage is only about Christ. They say, however, that sometimes an application to Solomon is made, because Solomon was a type of Christ, just as many things are credited to the type because of the antitype. But this is contrary to what 1 Chronicles 22:11 explicitly says, that here God had spoken to David concerning his own son, Solomon. (3) Some people take a different approach and say that this promise should be understood to have one literal meaning, but that it is compound, concerning both Solomon as the type and the Messiah as the antitype. A diversity of subjects in any given speech, however, does not give one meaning, but divergent meanings. Here, however, there are already different subjects; there is Solomon the son of David and there is the Messiah the God-man. (4) So if we leave these behind, the meaning that best fits the text is about Solomon and the kingdom that belonged to him and his descendants. That is what the literal meaning of the passage in question concerns. The spiritual or mystical meaning, however, is about Christ and his kingdom and blessings. For God put him, as an antitype, under the figure of Solomon, who most certainly foreshadows and prefigures him. Related to this is what David says in his confession and thanksgiving to God in 2 Sam 7:19, “this is the form, the definition (this is more correctly used for the feminine noun, which is derived from the masculine word that is used in the clearly parallel passage in 1 Chronicles 17:17), of the man of the Lord God.” This means “O God, you promised me something that does not solely and completely concern my son who will be born from my loins, but you are in him outlining and prefiguring some other son and man, who will be the Lord God.” Indeed, the Hebrew word “from afar” seems to imply the same thing. “You have spoken, for the house of your servant, far in advance,” says David in 2 Samuel 7:19, which, indeed, most closely means “I hear that a son is promised to me and the heir of the land and kingdom of Israel, who will build the Temple in Jerusalem, but in addition I understand that something far in the future and remote is promised to me, namely, that blessed Seed, and longed-for Messiah.” This is all we have to say about the promise given to David.
(4) Psalm 2:7. “The Lord said to me, “You are my son. Today I have begotten you.” Becanus says that these words are understood in two ways according to their literal meaning. The first concerns the eternal begetting of Christ, and the apostle explains it this way in Hebrews 1:5. The second concerns the resurrection of Christ. The same apostle explains it this way in Acts 13:33.
We reply: (1) Two explanations exist for the passage of Acts 13:33. Some people twist the meaning of the words of verse 33, “raised Jesus,” to suppose “from the dead,” as verse 34 adds, and say that the words of Psalm 2:7 are joined and applied to the resurrection of Christ for the reason that, in the resurrection, that which was previously conceiled beneath weakness (namely, the fact that this person is truly the Son of God, begotten of the Father from eternity) was revealed and announced. Thus, Romans 1:4 says that Christ was declared to be the Son of God by his resurrection from the dead. Others, however, do not interpret this verse to be about the resurrection, but about the sending of the Messiah into the world. Such people pay close attention to the apostle’s goal (he proposed two things that he would prove from the Old Testament: firstly the sending of the Messiah, compare verse 32 with 23; secondly his resurrection from the dead, compare verse 30 with 34.) and to the obviously antithetical verse 34 (“On the other hand, that he raised him from the dead,” and so on, where the adversative indicates that this verse is about something other than the previous verse) and to the meaning of the Greek word “raised” (which means “display” and, when used absolutely, signifies the sending into the world and revealing of the Messiah – see Acts 2:30, 3:22, 26, 7:37 – and corresponds to the Hebrew word for “raise up” that is used in 2 Samuel 7:12 and 1 Chronicles 17:11). And therefore they assert that the words of Psalm 2:7, just as according to their literal meaning they concern the eternal begetting of Christ, are here employed for and pertain to the description of the subject at hand, namely, that he about whom Psalm 2:7 says “You are my son, today I have begotten you” is shown to the world to be not merely a man. Whichever meaning one accepts, a cloud of doubt easily gathers over the twofold meaning. (2) Though Becanus likes the former opinion more, nevertheless, he would recognise his own words (q. 6), where he asserts and confirms with examples that “the words of Old Testament Scripture in the New Testament are cited as they are applied by Christ and the apostles, not only according to their literal meaning, but also occasionally according to their mystical meaning.” Therefore, it does not follow that a passage concerning the resurrection of Christ cites Psalm 2 according to the literal meaning. For we have already explained how this text is applied.
(5) Psalm 2:12. “Kiss the son.” Salmeron, in order to prove that there are different literal meanings in these words, says (tom. I. prol. 8) that “this may be explained according to the letter in different ways, such as (1) worship the Son, (2) worship him in purity, (3) kiss the grain, or (4) take hold of discipline,” and in the same place he presents the authors of the different ideas.
We reply like this: (1) Becanus invalidates Salmeron again. His third comment concerning the material at hand is this: “There are many instances where the Hebrew text is translated in different ways, and it does not thereby follow that there are many literal meanings for the same letter, but only that there are many according to the different translations of the same passage.” Our quotation of Salmeron belongs to this category of sayings. (2) There is no question that any given text can be explained in different ways, but it makes sense that whatever meaning the Holy Spirit himself intended for that text is the only true literal meaning. (3) Christ, however, shows us how we should investigate that one literal meaning in words that are translated or explained in different ways (and particularly Psalm 2:12), in John 5:39, “search the Scriptures.” Included in this, among other things, is that we carefully consider the diction, the goal, what comes before and what follows, and that in this way we dig down to a certainty of the literal meaning and interpretation. (4) Though there is some danger in this “searching” into the text of the Psalm in question, it will also become clear, when we have excluded other interpretations, that we must insist on only one interpretation and explain ‘kiss the son’ as ‘worship, reverently receive, and cherish him’. The second translation is ‘worship him in purity’. Aquila changes it to ‘kiss purely’. This departs unnecessarily from the natural constitution of the words. For the Hebrew word is an adjective, not an adverb, and it means “pure” or “clear”, not “purely.” The Hebrew verb is never used absolutely, but always with an expressed direct object, to whom the kiss (and, by metonymy, the honor or adoration) is given. There is no clear reason, however, for why we should depart from the natural way in which these words are used. The third translation, “kiss the grain,” is absurd, clumsy and clearly foreign to the goal of the Psalm, as is clear from his own explanation, which Salmeron embellishes with these words (in the aforementioned passage), “The meaning of “adore” or “kiss” is that you receive with a kiss of reverence in the Sacrament of the Eucharist, under the elements of bread and wine, the Son of God, that you worship him, and revere him with sincere faith, so that you may in this way escape the wrath of the Father against those who despise and do not receive him.” I have allowed you to see this so that you could have something to laugh at, my friends! (4) The fourth translation, “take hold of discipline,” is how the Seventy get it wrong, as well as the Targum, which has “receive the teaching.” But even this (although it seems to agree with the general intent of the passage) departs greatly from the letter of the passage. For this Hebrew verb nowhere means “receive” or “take hold of,” and undoubtedly the Septuagint, together with the Chaldaean, has a slightly different reading (from a verb that is only used in the Hiphil, and bears that signification that they are employing), because of the similar sound of the letters. The Hebrew word for “pure” never means “doctrine” or “institution,” so it seems that they take “pure” to mean “doctrine” (which means “pure doctrine”). If we put all of these foreign explanations aside, then only the first remains, “kiss.” or (by metonymy) “worship the Son.” This is clearly the only true literal meaning of this passage, when we consider: (1) The propriety of the diction, from which we ought not rashly to depart. The Hebrew root means “to kiss” out of love, honor and reverence (therefore also, by metonymy, “to show honor”; it is clear that this rhetorical device should be allowed here, from the fact that the Church Militant cannot give Christ a bodily kiss). The Hebrew substantive means “son” (either from the Hebrew root “to clean” or “to cleanse,” so that the Son of God is is called “pure” because he is distinct from sinners, or from the Hebrew root “to elect” or “to choose,” so that he is, as it were, the chosen and beloved Son; compare Isaiah 42:1 with Matthew 12:18). (2) The goal. For the entire Psalm is about the eternal Son of God, about whom in verse 7 God the Gather expressly says, “You are my Son. Today I have begotten you.” (3) What follows. For the words follow: “lest perchance he be angry” and so on, and “blessed are all who trust in him.” It is necessary, however, both for the verb to refer to some subject and for the (relative) pronoun to refer to something before. This, however, is nothing other than “the son,” to whom he commands that a kiss, that is, reverence and obedience, be given. This is all we have to say about the words of this Psalm.
(6) Isaiah 53:4. “Surely he bore our sicknesses and he carried our sorrows.” Peter interprets this according to the letter (Becanus says) to be about our sins in 1 Peter 2:24. But Matthew 8:17 explains it to be about the bodily diseases that Christ removed and healed. We reply: (1) It is certain that, according to the literal meaning, the prophet is here concerned with Christ’s passion and the spiritual healing that comes to men through it, as is clear from the entire context and especially verses 5 and 11, and the clear explanation of it that may be found in 1 Peter 2:24. Could it be, however, that Matthew asserts that the prophet’s words are fulfilled in the healing of bodily diseases, which was given by Christ? Nothing could be further from the truth. The evangelist is applying these words for his own purpose, not without knowing what he is doing, as Erasmus said, and not doing too much violence to the text, as Porphyry claimed, but for an obvious reason, namely, that he might show what the beginning and foundation of diseases is, which is sin alone; and then what the beginning of Christ’s work is. For in taking our sicknesses (which are the effects and penalties for sins), he indicated that he would take upon himself our sins, as in 1 Peter 2:24. Then also, and especially, that he might show the goal and purpose of the miracles that he performed. For Christ was beginning to make his many miracles known at that time, so that no one would think, as the crowd at that time did, that Christ was only an experienced physician of the body. The evangelist, therefore, wanted by this textual application to lift the minds of men anagogically to spiritual things, so that their thoughts might be occupied by the healing of the soul rather than the body. Christ himself makes this goal and purpose clear in the miracle of healing in Matthew 9:2 and John 5:14. (2) There remains, therefore, one single meaning of Isaiah’s words, which Matthew applied by analogy for his own purpose. Becanus himself, moreover, concedes that this kind of textual application sometimes takes place, as we demonstrated a little earlier.
(7) Isaiah 53:8. “Of his generation who will tell?” Becanus says that these words have two literal meanings and Salmeron says that they have five, according to the different explanation of Church Fathers. We reply as follows. We have already made clear what we should think about the explanations of the Church Fathers and other interpreters. In this paragraph, we assert that there is one literal meaing of the Prophetic utterance, which flows from the natural signification of the words, namely, that it is a description of the duration of Christ’s life or of the eternal Christ in the glory of his heavenly Majesty, life and glory, as the apostle explains in Romans 6:9-10: “We know that since Christ was raised from the dead, he is no longer dead; death no longer has dominion over him. For because he died, he died to sin once and for all; but because he lives, he lives for God.” This meaning shines out because of: (1) the clear diction. For the Hebrew word for generation properly signifies “duration and time of life,” and it is wrong to depart from this signification, since it agrees perfectly with the prophetic goal. (2) the goal: the prophet describes both the humility of Christ, his passion and emptying of himself in chapter 53, and the greatness of the glory into which he entered after his passion; everything in this chapter falls under one of these two categories. Since, however, these words do not pertain to the passion of Christ, we are left with the alternative, namely, that they refer to the glory or glorious continuation of eternal life. (3) the context of what went immediately before, “under arrest and on trial he was taken away.” “Arrest” was the chains of his passion and death; “trial” was God’s opposition to the sins that were imputed to him. From these things the Savior broke out, when he rose again, by the glory of the Father, as Romans 6:4 says. It is this glory that the prophet is admiring when he asks, “who will tell of his duration and life?” (4) finally, a comparison with what follows, especially verse 10, where this Hebrew word “duration” is explained more clearly, “Even if his soul makes him to be an offering, he will see his offspring, he will prolong his days and the will of the Lord will prosper by his hand.” Concerning this prophetic passage, this is all we have to say, and from this it is easy to see what decision to make concerning the different meanings that they fabricate.
(8) Daniel 9:27. “And there will be in the Temple an abomination of desolation, and the desolation will persist until the consummation and the end.” This prophecy (Becanus says), according to its literal meaning, seems capable of being understood not only concerning the destruction of Jerusalem, which would happen during the reign of Antiochus in 1 Maccabees 1:57, but also concerning the destruction that would occur after the death of Christ. We reply: (1) Becanus’ word “seems” unravels and totters by the words “does not seem.” Also, the Jesuit Pererius disproves the first meaning (lib. 10. comment. super Daniel. ch. 9), who says, “For firstly, Gabriel signifies to Daniel the bad things that pertained to the Jews who had been taken captive already for seventy weeks. That idol of Antiochus, however, was placed in the Temple of the Jews in about the 41st week, which was no less than 160 years before Christ’s coming. Secondly, Gabriel affirms that the abomination of desolation will remain until the end, that is, forever. That idol, however, did not stand for more than three years. (2) Only the latter meaning, therefore, remains, of which Christ’s application approves in Matthew 24:15, Mark 13:14 and Luke 21:20.
(9) John 11:50. The words of Caiphas the priest, “It is better for us that one man die for the people and that the entire race not perish.” Salmeron (tom. 1. prol. 8. p. 82) and Cornelius (in praefat. Pentateuchi can. 36) perceive here a twofold literal meaning. Caiphas intended one of them, the Holy Spirit intended the other. We reply: (1) Some distinguish between the literal meaning of what is said and its essential meaning, which is, that it is better for one man to die for the people so that the entire race does not perish; and [they distinguish] between the final cause of what is said and the corresponding application, which behaves differently for Caiphas and the Evangelist. (2) We ourselves very simply procede like this: The question that we posit here concerns the words of Scripture, which of them, and to what extent they recognize the Holy Spirit as their author. Therefore, insofar as those words were produced by the Holy Spirit through Caiphas (that they are from the Holy Spirit is clear from verse 51, where not only negatively does it say “This he said not from himself”, but also positively, “since he was the high Priest for that year, he prophesied.”), to that extent, they have only one literal meaning, which is uniquely intended by the Holy Spirit, and which the Evangelist explains in verse 51 with these words: “He prophesied what would be, that Jesus would die for the people.” We care very little, however, for what Caiphas intended or what he was thinking about. (3) Salmeron himself clearly agrees with this opinion of ours (tom. 16. disput. 1. in 2 Petr. p.123), saying: “Caiphas only uttered the words that spoke of the saving death of Christ, but he did not understand what he was saying. But those things that he did not understand, to the extent that they came from the Holy Spirit, he spewed forth more than he prophecied. For the word “Caiphas” means “spewing from the mouth” (he is thinking of the Hebrew words for “spew” and “mouth”, although the Syrian is a little different) “because he brought forth words that were clearly undigested.” This is all for the second canon.
Canon 3
Every passage of Scripture allows a literal meaning.
The reasoning of this canon is clear from this: That the foundation and support for the mystical meaning is the literal meaning, which we also look at first and most closely in the words of Scripture. But in opposition:
(1) Nicholas of Lyra (prol. 3. super Bibl.) posited that some examples in Scripture do not have a literal meaning, but only a mystical, and that this happens (1) when there is a parable, as in Judges 9:8, “the trees went forth to annoint a king over them.” (2) when there is a metaphor, as in Matthew 5:30, “If your right hand causes you to sin, cut it off.” “Neither example here allows a literal meaning,” he says, “or else the meaning would be false or absurd. For when we consider the literal meaning, it is untrue that the trees went to annoint a king over them, and it is absurd for it to be best for a hand to be cut off, as often as someone commits a sin by it. Therefore the meaning of each example should be the mystical or spiritual meaning, so that by “trees of the woods” we understand the men of Shechem, who came together to choose for themselves a king. And by “right hand” he means the neighbor from whom we ought to separate ourselves, if he is a stumbling block to us.” Nicholas of Lyra says these things in opposition to the canon at hand, which is easy to defend against such objections, if we bear in mind that: (1) the literal meaning is that which is most closely signified through the words of Scripture, whether they are employed in that passage properly or figuratively. And where the words are placed and employed figuratively, there the literal meaning is whatever those terms that are put there figuratively imply. In this way, therefore, the literal meaning of the passage: “if your right hand causes you to sin, cut it off” is not what Nicholas of Lyra claimed was riddled with absurdity, but what he himself called the mystical meaning. But these things were explained above. (2) We will treat parables at greater length later. For this passage, we treat the matter like this: Every parable is a similitude, and there are two parts to it. One: the thing to which the similitude is applied. Two: the thing by which the comparison is made, or the “kernal” of the parable, according to which the application is made. Each part has its own literal meaning, but with this difference: the meaning of the second part is literal when we are talking about what the words most closely signify. If, however, we are talking about the matter (the first part) to which the similitude is applied, it is the mystical meaning. Thus, in Matthew 13:33, there is the parable: “The Kingdom of Heaven is like yeast, which a woman took and hid in three measures of flour, until it was all leavened.” Here the first part of the parable is that which is being related in the similitude, the literal meaning of which is that a little yeast (when the woman mixes it into one lump with the flour) has the power to pervade, go throughout and increase to much more than it was before. Its second part is that to which the first part is applied, and is signalled by Christ in the first words: “the kingdom of heaven”. Its literal meaning, therefore, is that the Gospel has the power, just as when it was proclaimed in Palestine, quickly to pervade the entire world and make the Church much greater than it was. This is the literal meaning, if we are talking about what the words most closely signify. But if we are talking about the thing that is signified in the first part of the parable, it is the mystical meaning. For the yeast mystically signifies the Gospel, and the lump signifies the Church, or the entire world, in which the Gospel is preached. (3) From what has been said, it is clear what we should think concerning the parable that was cited from Nicholas of Lyra. The meaning of the first part that we presented is that which the words most closely signify. And we should not say that it is false. For that which is presented by means of a parable or similitude is presented in such a way, not as if it truly happened or could happen, but so that through such a similitude the second matter could better be explained. This can take place without lying. Compare Becanus (part 2. Theol. schol. tom. 2. tract. 1. ch.3. q.4).
(2) Also opposed, however, is the Canon of Origen and others of poor character, by which they transformed the majority of words from their literal meaning into allegories, and in this way effectively testified either that there is no literal meaning, or that we are not supposed to care very much about it, since, according to a twisted reading of the words of Paul in 2 Corinthians 3:6 taken out of context, the “letter kills”, that is, the literal meaning kills, and the “spirit makes alive”, that is, the mystical or allegorical meaning makes alive, even if it is imported into Scripture and a figment of the human imagination. But we will discuss these things below in the treatise on allegories.
Canon 4
The literal meaning of Scripture must in no way be separated from the words of Scripture.
The Pontifical writers also want to appear as if they are in no way divorcing the literal meaning of passages of Scripture from the those words of the Holy Spirit that are set forth in Scripture, but are deriving it from the words themselves, so that they might claim their solution and interpretation of Scripture to be agreed with the one by whose inspiration it was written down, according to 2 Peter 1:20-21. For this reason, Bellarmine, the champion of the Pontifical writers (De Verbo Dei, book 3, ch. 3) writes, “We can be sure that the meaning that comes directly from the words is the meaning of the Holy Spirit.” And Acosta (lib. 3. de Christo revel. ch. 11) writes, “The Church cannot give Scripture a literal meaning that it does not already have.” The same author a little later (c.21) writes, “Nothing seems to me to open up the Scriptures quite like Scripture itself. And so diligent, careful and frequent reading, and meditation and comparison of all the Scriptures seems to me to be the highest rule for understanding the Scriptures.” Agrippa agree with this (de vanit. scient. ch. 100), saying: “Greater is the authority of Holy Scripture, Augustine says, than all the discernment of the human intellect; for it has one, unchanging and simple meaning, with which it fights and wins.” But if we were to examine more closely the “mystery of lawlessness” [2 Thess. 2:7] and the methodology of the Roman Church, we may clearly discern in it that the literal meaning is as far removed from the words of Scripture as it could be. They make it all about the Church and the pectoral box of the Roman Pontiff, and appropriate it all for his use, and in this way they teach something that is closely akin to Schwenckfeldianism. And so that we do not seem to have asserted this gratuitously, we set forth for consideration:
(1) The public confession of the Pontifical writers themselves. Becanus (in lib. de jud. controv. p. 78) writes, “It is one thing for the words of Scripture to be clear; it is another for the meaning of Scripture to be clear. For the clarity of the words depends on the understanding of grammar; the clarity of meaning, however, depends on the intention and counsel of the Holy Spirit,” whom Bellarmine (De Verbo Dei, book 3, c.3) says “may certainly be found in the Church, that is, in the Council of Bishops, when it is confirmed by the highest Pastor of the Church, or in the highest Pastor with the counsel of other pastors.” You are hearing it effectively denied that the meaning of the Holy Spirit can or ought to be gathered from the words of Scripture. Gordon Huntlaeus (in contr. ep. controv. I. ch. 3) writes, “The written Word of God consists of two parts: the letter, which is written in books, and the true meaning of the letter, which is like the spirit and life of the letter, since without this, the letter alone can kill but cannot make alive.” This meaning, which is the “spirit of Scripture, to be sought from the interpretation of the Church, as the Judge who cannot make a mistake, but not from the clear letter of Scripture itself,” we will discuss in the next chapter. Indeed, Huntlaeus rightly stated that “the Word of God consists of two parts: the letter, and the true meaning of the letter”, since they are related to one another like the material and formal, like the soul and the ensouled body. He ought to have added, however, that we are not to search for the form outside of its material, nor for the soul outside of its body (insofar as it is an informing form), that is, that we are not to search for the meaning of Scripture outside of that letter or outside of those words of Scripture, but that we should dig it up out of them in an appropriate and agreeable way. He does not do this, but commends that we should look for it in the interpretation of the Church, as the impeccable Judge, and in the end (ch. 28) he adds these words: “the true meaning of the letter” (that is, the reasoning by which we should understand the letter properly or figuratively) “is not obtained from Scripture alone, but also from the teaching and tradition of the Church.” (Note well that he does indeed join Scripture and the Church, but from what follows, it is clear that he is claiming the meaning of Scripture only for the Church of the Pope and his tradition. For he goes on to speak like this:) “From this it also follows that the written Word of God contains the smallest part of the Word of God, which is, of course, only the letter; but the Word that is preached and handed down preserves and puts forth the chief part of the Word of God, which is, of course, the true and understanding of the letter.” So Gordon says, from whose words we may easily gather how far the Pope’s church is from Schwenckfeldianism. For just as Schwenckfeld used to refer men to an inward spirit, though which the Scriptures (the “dead letter” by themselves) might be understood in a way that brought life so the pontifical writers refer men to the Church, from which we are supposed to seek the true meaning of Scripture. The Roman Church, that is, the Roman Pope, together with his Councils and bishops, is already putting out interpretations of Scripture that are false, superstitious, and foreign to the letter of the text (which declares something very different). Those of Papal faith are required to consider and revere these as true interpretations, and thus (as I said before) the meaning of Scripture is separated as far as possible from the words. The saying of Bellarmine pertains to this (De Verbo Dei, book 3, ch. 9. §. 1), “It is self-evident that Scripture is not the judge” (of difficulties concerning the faith) “because it is given different meanings and cannot say for itself which is true.” Bellarmine, what a metamorphosis! In chapter 3, you were asserting that “The meaning that is taken directly from the words is certain to be the meaning of the Holy Spirit.” If Scripture, in its own words, really does say with certainty what its meaning is, then now you are wrongly forgetting yourself and obscuring this fact.
(2) The assertion of pontifical writers, that Scripture is the “dead letter” (Schwenckfeld and his followers used to assert the same thing) “that ultimately needs to be made alive by the Spirit of the Church.” Salmeron (comment. in Epist. Pauli in gener. disp. 8. §. tertio quia). Turrian (contra Sadeel. p. 99). Hear how Coster, surpassing all others, belches immodestly against the Scriptures (in ench. cap. de summo Pontifice p.131), “If Christ had left us Scripture alone for a judge, with this judge the Church would not have had enough to deliberate and advise, because (as it is something without soul or sensation) it could not complaint if it were being pulled apart to support different and contradictory opinion, nor, with no external judgment, could it prove that it is being twisted and modified into a false and wicked meaning. It was convenient, therefore, for there to be this living judge (namely, the Roman Pope), so that he could be the interpreter of his mind” (really his own mind, and not that of Scripture). From these we can understand what the following words of the same Coster are trying to say (p. 42), “Christ wanted his church neither to depend on written documents, nor to entrust her holy mysteries to parchment, but since he established a spiritual Church that was formed by his Holy Spirit, he used a pen more profound, writing with the finger of God on the heart of the Church.” Gordon, in the place we mentioned, say that the pontifical writers assert these things, “concerning the letter when it is alone, the nude and dead letter, which lacks the true meaning, but not concerning the very life and soul of the letter, which is the true meaning.” We should reply like this: we ask, however, what they want us to understand by “letter” and what by “soul of the letter”. The words we have quoted show us that by the former, they understand the written word of God, as it is etched in ink in the book of the Bible; by the latter, they understand the meaning brought to it by the Church with her spirit. What else follows from this, however, than that Scripture itself (not yet ensouled by the Pope’s interpretation) is a “dead letter,” which only receives its soul, as it were, and life from the Church and the Pope?
(3) Another assertion of the pontifical writers, that “The meaning of the Scriptures can be different for different times and situations.” For if we allow the hypothesis of a variety of meanings, then it is impossible for there to be any fixed relation between the letter of Scripture and its literal meaning. Indeed, this is what Cardinal Cusanus writes in a letter (ad Bohem.), discussing the practice of celebrating the Eucharist under one kind, “Let this not upset you, that at different times you find different rites used for sacrifices and also for the Sacraments, while the truth still stands, and that the Scriptures are adapted for the occasion and understood in different ways, so that people explain them in one age according to the contemporary rite that is used everywhere, and when the rite changes, then the opinion changes.” And again, “For this reason, even if today the Church had a different interpretation of the precept of the Gospel than it once had, nevertheless, we should accept the meaning that is now in use, when it is inspired by the Church’s direction, as agreeable to the time and congruent with the way of salvation.” And a little later, “Do not be amazed, if the practice of the Church at one time is interpreted in one way, and at another time is interpreted in another way. For the understanding goes with the practice, since the understanding, which accompanies the practice, is the life-giving Spirit.” Duraeus (contra Witackerum fol. 45.) approves of this opinion of Cusanus. Indeed, some people become so bold as to assert that “perhaps sometimes it was expedient, and not displeasing to God the author of Scripture, in certain cases to twist the Scriptures somewhat from their genuine meaning, in order to mislead the souls of one’s subjects.” But what an unholy assertion that there is a “holy deceit”! What blasphemy, that such fraud is pleasing to God himself, who is Truth!
Opposed, therefore, to this error of the pontifical writers, is this fourth canon, that the literal meaning of Scripture, which is one in number, single and unchanging, must not be separated from the letter of Scripture, but drawn from it, in agreement with the Author’s goal and the analogy of faith. We prove this canon by this one fundamental principle, that there is a very precise coherence between words and meaning. Just as words, whether they are delivered orally or scratched out in writing, are a representation of the ideas of the mind (unless they are Delphic oracles or the oracles of Carmenta), so they are also like the store room of the meaning (as the conception of the speaker or writer intends it), or its outer shell, from which the meaning, like a seed, can and should be extracted. But again, the Holy Scriptures are the words of the Holy Spirit. The Scriptures, therefore, are most certainly a store room of the meaning that is intended by the Holy Spirit, out of which, in the words of Hilary (book 1. De Trinitate), “our understanding is to be awaited rather than imposed, and exported rather than imported.”
This argument quite clearly makes the following points: (1) That the prophets and apostles in unison set before their listeners the same thing that they later entrusted the will of God to writing. See 2 Corinthians 1:13, 1 John 1:3-4, 2:7. Therefore, just as the hearers of the prophets and apostles were able to know God’s will (which is the mind and thought of the Holy Spirit) from their words, so we can know the same from the written word of God. Preaching and writing are external accidents, which do not change the word of God itself. If God spoke to us today directly, with those same words that are written in the Scriptures, then we would certainly and immediately know the will of God from that speech and we would confess that we knew it. Why, then, would we want to deny this when his words are written down? (2) That Scripture says this about itself, or about the written word, that just as the written word instruct the eyes of the reader, so it instruct the ears that hear it when it is delivered by the living voice. For this reason, the verb for speaking is used quite frequently, in Matthew 21:4, 22:31, Romans 3:19, 10:8, and 1 Corinthians 2:6-7. And Scripture itself is called the word or speech (of God), that is, an utterance, in direct contrast with an inner thought (see 1 Cor 15:34 and 2 Pet 1:19). Indeed, Luke 16:29 tells us to listen to Moses and the prophets in their writings. And this is where that activeness and power of the Holy Spirit comes from, which is spoken of in Hebrew 4:12: “the Word of God is living and powerful, and cuts deeper than any two edged sword, and goes so far as to divide between soul and spirit, joints and marrow; it discerns between the thoughts and intentions of the heart.” It was because Augustine (so say Anglo-Rhemens. on Rom. 13) heard that heavenly voice, “pick it up! Read!” and because he read that message to the Romans, “not in orgies” and so on, that from that reading he was converted to faith and repentance.
From this we conclude as follows: If (1) God himself speaks to us through the Scriptures, and if (2) he is always saying the same things that once he spoke through the living voice of the prophets and apostles, and indeed, if (3) Scripture itself speaks, and if (4) that speech is supremely effectual for converting the hearts of its hearers, it follows that its meaning is contained within it, and should be gathered from it, and that it is in no way a “dead letter,” which needs its meaning to be imported from outside of itself, the Church or some man. The first part is true, as we proved earlier, therefore so is the latter part. For more on this, see the writings of our preeminent master, Dr. Gerhard (tom. 1. de Script. interpret. §. 11. seqq.).
Canon 5
The literal meaning is especially useful for making an argument, but not to the exclusion of the mystical meaning.
Some people express the canon simply like this: “We may look for firm and effective arguments from the literal meaning alone.” Thomas says (part 1. q. 1. art. 10), “Only the literal meaning is useful for making an argument.” Sixtus Senensis says (lib. 3. Bibl. sanct. p.141), “Only the literal explanation is able to support the truth and deconstruct falsehood.” Polydorus Virgil says (de invent. rer. l. 4. ch. 9), “No explanation bears sufficient force to crush heresies, unless it truly, purely, and faithfully explains the literal meaning.” For this reason, Bellarmine says (De Verbo Dei book 3, ch. 3), “We and our opponents are agreed that effective arguments should be sought from the literal meaning alone.” He asserts this quite rightly against the mystical meaning of the pontifical writers, who consider any of the allegories of the Church Fathers, as well as any of their explanations for the parables (which they heap up high over the literal meaning of Scripture), to be mystical meanings. Vega has something good to say about this (lib. 9. de justif. ch. 44), and Thomas, who says (part. 1. q. 1. art. 10), “Symbolic arguments are certainly not useful for making another argument. Theologians hold this opinion in common, that we can take no effective argument from the mystical meaning for affirming matters of faith.” For this reason, Bellarmine (in the aforemention work), again quite rightly gives this reason for his assertion, “For it is certain that the meaning that we gather directly from the words is the meaning of the Holy Spirit. But there are different mystical and spiritual meanings, and although they may edify (when they are not contrary to the faith or morals), nevertheless, it is not always evident whether they are intended by the Holy Spirit.” Hence, we should consider the assertion of Cornelius a Lapide to be too bold, when he proclaims indifferently (in Script. encom. praefixo comm. in Pentat.), “The historical meaning of Scripture comes first, but the mystical meaning is more important, and the theologian draws from the latter just as from the former, to establish the strongest argument for his teachings.” The assertion of Gretser is no different, who says: “Solid arguments can be sought from the spiritual meaning, whenever that meaning is clear to us, either from Scripture itself, or from the tradition of the Church and the teaching that is common to the holy Fathers.” This amounts to the same thing, says Gregory de Valent. (1. p. D. Thom. Disp. 1. q. 1. p. 5). But who cannot see that every stinking whiff of papistic allegory is dedicated in this way to proving their religious teachings? Therefore that passage of Augustine’s letter 93, which is addressed to Vincent the Donatist, deserves to be quoted here (Ep. 93.8), “Who with any sense of shame would try to interpret something allegorical to support himself, unless he has elsewhere the clearest possible testimonies, by [the light of] which he can illumine what is obscure?” And Jerome, who in his commentary on Matthew 13, when he is recounting the interpretation of those who understand by the three sowings of grain the holy Trinity, adds, “This is a pious meaning, but a parable or a doubtful understanding of things that perplex us can never be useful for establishing the authority of doctrines.” And Augustine in the same place says (Ep. 93 against Vincent, which Bellarmine quotes in the place we mentioned), “One rightly mocks the Donatists, who gather from the words, “Show me where you graze, where you recline at mid-day” (Song of Songs 1:7), when they are mystically explained, that the Church of Christ remained only in the southern region of Africa, in which they themselves were living.” So far, so good.
We cannot deny, however, that we can just as well look for confirmation of our teachings from the mystical meaning (when Scripture intends and explains it). For it remains true that arguments may firmly be drawn from every word of God. Now then, no one has dared to doubt that the mystical meaning and its explanation in the Scriptures is the word of God. Therefore, subsequently, even Salmeron rightly declares the same thing (comm. in hebr. 1. disp. 7. §. cite), “Arguments are valid when they come from the mystical meaning and the proven meaning, but they are not so when they come from the mystical meaning and a self-generated meaning in support of someone’s idea. But no one can reject the mystical meanings that were assigned by the apostles, because the signs, by which they shone, the wisdom of their teaching and the holiness of their life testify to and affirm their truth.” And Azorius says (inst. moral. ch. 2), “It is useful for confirming the faith when it is plainly established from some other passage of Scripture, such as those mystical meanings, which Paul and the other apostles explained.” And this is why we phrased this canon not exclusively, but comparatively.
So that you can make your own judgment more fairly concerning this, we add the following notes: (1) In proving the doctrines of the faith, special attention should be paid to the clear, firm and self-evident testimonies of Scripture. For there is no teaching of the faith that the Holy Spirit has not openly, clearly and perspicuously set forth in mulptiple or even a great many passages. (2) The mystical meaning, the allegorical and typological, insofar as it is able to prove anything, is also explained in Scripture itself. In this way, Paul established the typological meaning of the account of Sara and Hagar and their children, Isaac and Ishmael, in Romans 9:7-9 and in greater detail in Galatians 4:22 and following, and thereby shows or illustrates God’s two testaments. We, therefore, may safely confirm the same teaching from that allegorical meaning, since the apostle showed it to us. In the same way, we infer the raising of Christ onto the cross and our justification through faith from the raising of the bronze serpent in the desert, and the healing of the Isaraelites for their snake bites, which came about only by looking at the raised serpent, because the Savior himself, in John 3:14-15, reveals this mystical and typological meaning for that account. (3) In parables, the argument is drawn not from the literal meaning of the first part of the parable (which contains the thing drawn out into a similitude) but from the literal meaning of the second part (which contains the thing to which the similitude is applied, and about which the speech of the one telling the parable is principally concerned), which is the mystical meaning of the first part. (4) Nevertheless, we can and should draw our proof not from everything, to which we seem to be able to apply the first part, but only from that, of which mention is expressly made in Scripture, or which is drawn from the certain goal of the parable. If it happens otherwise, that saying of Irenaeus applies (book 2, ch. 46), “Because parables are capable of being finished in many different ways, who among those who love the truth will not admit that coming to conclusions from them, in our inquiry of God, while abandoning what is certain, doubtless and true, is proper to those who hurl themselves into danger and cannot be reasoned with?”
Article 4
Canons Specific to the Literal Meaning.
So far, we have put down canons that concern the literal meaning of Scripture as we distinguish it from the mystical meaning. But because there exist some considerable difficulties with the literal meaning, as it is divided into proper and figurative categories (we mentioned this distinction above in article 2), and disagreements arise, therefore we must now establish and define specifically, through canons, when the proper literal meaning (which they call “the spoken word”) should be kept or when we should go to the figurative meaning in our interpretation of Scripture. And certainly, since we are here discussing the holiest oracles, on which we are built (Eph 2:20), and which are the words of eternal life, it is necessary for us to discuss them conscientiously and wisely, so that we do not decide anything thoughtlessly, and so that we do not invent a trope where there is none, or say that there is none where there is. Let the following, therefore stand:
Canon 1
We must adhere strictly to the proper literal meaning unless (1) it openly and truly runs contrary to the articles of faith or commandments of love; and (2) the speech is, at the same time, self-evidently or from other passages found and proven to be figurative.
Some people phrase the canon like this: “The words of Scripture are always to be understood properly, unless the coherence of the text, or a clearer explanation, or the analogy of faith requires a tropological explanation.” Blessed Martin Luther says (tom. 3. de Jen. de serv. arbit. p. 195), “So let us be of the opinion that no trope should be allowed in any passage of Scripture, unless the circumstances of the words makes it obvious, and the absurdity of the matter clearly offends some article of faith. But in all places, we should cling to the simple, pure and natural meaning of the words, which the grammar and manner of speaking determines.” Let us also look at the consensus between the pontifical writers and some Calvanists. Bellarmine says (book 1. de Eucharist. c. 9. §. ult.), “The common rule for explaining Scripture is never to let go of the proper meaning of the words, unless we are forced to do so, by some other passage of Scripture, or by some article of faith, or – certainly – by the common explanation of the whole Church,” (We should disapprove of this last one in the series.) “for otherwise, the faith will pass away, and only opinions about divinity will be left over, and the gate will be open for limitless heresies.” In the same work, he says (ch. 12. §. Sed tota), “Our adversaries” (the Calvanists) “should not ask us why we pursue the proper meaning of the words; because that would be like if someone were to ask people who are on a journey why they are following the common, well trod path. For no sane person asks that. Or it is like someone who asks why we enter through the door and not through the window.” Salmeron says (pro. 12. can. 13. tom. 1. oper.), “When we can easily get the literal meaning comes from the words when we take them properly, there is no need to run to tropes and figures of speech.” Maldonatus says (super Matth. 8:12), “Interpreting figuratively what we can interpret properly is the business of unbelievers and those who look for alleged deformities in the faith.” De Toledo says (super Luc. X), “When we can get the literal meaning from the proper signification of the words, we should not retreat to the figurative meaning.” Suarez says (tom. 2. lib. 2. de stat. relig. ch. 10), “We should not let an improper use of words stand, except by good reason and authority.” Ursinus the Calvinist (in explicat. catech. p. 509), in his dispute against the Anabaptists who are supposing a synechdoche in the word “family” (which was baptized by the apostles), says this, “How should we be able to recognise whether we are to understand any given word or speech in Scripture properly or figuratively?” Augustine indicates a tropological interpretation like this (lib. 3. de doctr. Christ. ch. 10. & 15), “If you should be unable to apply the saying, when properly understood, to faith, love, or any edification whatsoever.” But since these interpretations, concerning a matter of such great importance, depend on the judgment of men (for someone can think that something is edifying or not edifying, or moves us to love or does not, when it is actually doing something different), therefore we need to give the criteria for judging whether the literal meaning is proper or figurative. The two that this canon sets forth are most important. They are, of course, (1) if the word or speech does not openly and truly run contrary to the clear articles of faith or commandments of love, and at the same time, (2) if the meaning is in that passage or elsewhere found and proven to be most obviously figurative. Since there are two parts to this assertion, we also append here two notes of caution.
(1) Concerning the first part, note that the words “openly” and “truly” are not added without good reason. For there are people who turn away from the spoken word and from the proper literal meaning, and so to figures, because, by their own judgment and opinion, the proper meaning of the words runs against another article of faith. The Calvinists teach this way, as we are all agreed, because of the proper meaning of the words of institution for the Lord’s Supper, and they invent tropes there, because the words when understood properly, run in opposition to the article of faith concerning the truth of the Lord’s body and blood. So say Sadeel (de sacr. mand. ch. 4) and Bucanus (loco 48. seqq.). It likewise runs contrary to the article on Christ’s ascension to heaven, according to Witacker (quaest. 5. c. 9. de Script. etc.). But this disagreement is not true, but only apparent, since it is not based on Scripture but drawn out from reason. For Scripture asserts both teachings with clear and obvious words in their respective proof passages. Therefore we should also accept both teachings with true obedience of faith, and not make them opposed to each other.
(2) Concerning the second part, note that (1) proof of a trope is to be preferred when it comes from the same passage and from the evidence of the text, rather than from elsewhere, and (2) other passages of Scripture, from which a speech is proven to be figurative, should not be foreign or not at home, but they should be homogenous or parallel and they should treat the same material into which you are inquiring. Again, the Calvinists break this law, who – when they are looking for passages of Scripture, by which they might be able to prove their metonymy in the substantial words of the Lord’s Supper – retreat to those passages that are not at all parallel. Such are those passages in which they claim the “sacramental propositions,” as they call them, are contained, and especially John 6 (which Oecolampadius used to call his iron and bronze wall and likewise his angel, armed with a fiery sword against us), where Christ is concerned not with the sacramental eating that was instituted at least a year later, but the spiritual eating, which is nothing other than “true faith,” which drinks deep, from the fulness of Christ, of the grace of God, the remission of sins, righteousness and eternal life. For more on this, see Canon 4.
Canon 2
Wherever an article of faith is expressly being related, there especially we must insist on the proper literal meaning or spoken word.
The reason for this law is that every article of faith, at some place in the Scriptures, is explicitly set forth in proper and perspicuous words, and the proper words of that article are, as it were, its seat and home. Augustine says (De Doctrina Christiana, book 2, ch. 6, 9), “Nothing is said obscurely in the Scriptures, which pertains to faith or morals, which is not said very plainly in other passages.” Therefore where we are considering a passage like this, in which some article of faith is expressly being related, there we rightly allow ourselves to be separated not a finger’s breadth from the proper meaning of the words. Our use of this canon is also against the Calvinists, who try to obscure the substantial words of the Holy Supper with different tropological clouds. But rightly and deservedly, we oppose them with this: that the words of institution, in Matthew 26, Mark 16, Luke 22 and 1 Cor 10 and 11, are the proper “seat” for this article, and in this “seat,” the article is being set out expressly. The substantial words of this article, therefore, should be understood properly, according to the spoken word. If they ever say that John 6 shows what kind of eating of Christ’s body takes place in the Lord’s Supper, we will say in reply that a demonstration of figurative speech should come from passages that are truly parallel, which John 6 is not, as we said in the last canon.
But some people raise the following objections against this opinion of ours: (1) It often happens that tropes are mixed in with the same passage where there is a “seat” for an article of faith. For example, in the words of the Lord’s Supper, there is metonymy, of the container for the content, and synechdoche (part for the whole), when he says, “This is the cup that was poured out for you” in Luke 22:20. For it is not the cup, but the blood of Christ, which is being given to us in the sacramental cup, and which was poured out for us. We reply as follows. The point is taken, but not conceded. It is clear, however, that Matthew 28:28 and Mark 16:24 explain this trope for this proper “seat” of the article. But if the Calvinists could provide the same kind of proof for their own figmented tropes in the substantial words themselves of this article, they would have a healthy, solid case. That they are unable to furnish such evidence, however, is certainly perspicuous and evident enough from the sheer number of different interpretations. (2) In the first mention of the Gospel, the devil is called – either by metonymy or synechdoche – a serpent; the destruction of Satan’s kingdom is called the crushing of its head; the sufferings and death of Christ are called the piercing of his heel. (Consid. Commonef. part. 1. num. 40) We reply like this. We concede that articles of faith are sometimes expressed with some tropes, but we must also add this, that there is not a single article of faith that does not at least in some place have its own “seat” in the Scriptures. In that “seat,” with words meant properly and without trope (this preserves its substance), each article expressly sets forth what is true, still about that first promise, which was explained transparently and using the most proper words, not only in the prophetic writings of the Old Testament, but also in the apostolic writings of the New. See Isaiah 53 and 1 John 3:8, and so on.
Canon 3
We must take words that contain the first institution or new precept for a new religious practice or covenant according to their proper literal meaning and without tropes.
We should add this: unless the clearest explanation of some trope is present. The reason for this canon, however, is this, namely, that God sets forth these words as a rule, against which we should measure and judge all things that are called into question and cause disagreement. Therefore God expressed them properly and perspicuously, so that no one could seize the opportunity to transgress. By way of example, we may present: (1) The institution of circumcision and the Paschal lamb in Genesis 17 and Exodus 12. (2) The publication of the Decalog in Exodus 20. (3) All of Leviticus, which (more than any other sacred book) was written in words that are hardly modified at all. (4) The institution of Baptism in Matthew 28, Mark 16 and John 3. (5) To this list we add the words of the Holy Supper, which very clearly describe and contain not only a new commandment to eat the body and drink the blood of Christ, and a new religious practice, but also the institution of the New Testament.
Canon 4
The declaration and demonstration of a tropological meaning should be (1) evident, and (2) sufficient.
First of all, we require evidence. In the words of my teacher, Dr. Gerhard (tom. 5. de Coena §. 71) “Indeed, when someone is comprehending something written or spoken, if he stays with the common understanding of words, it is like he is standing on a public road or on his own land. If anyone should want to drive him off of it in some quarrel or disagreement, he would need to have some very good and evident reasons.” The quotation of Bellarmine, which we included in Canon 1, is also relevant here. If there is no evidence (which, in the opinion of Francis Junius, should be simple and not comprised of many parts – lib. 2. contr. Bellarm.) to prove [a tropological meaning], the words are rightly taken according to their proper literal meaning.
The second thing that we require for proof of a trope is that it be sufficient. “Because many people who want to demonstrate a trope in some passage think that is is enough to provide one or two examples that are similar. But this is making an argument from the particular to the universal. Perhaps this is enough for clarifying a text, but for an evident demonstration, it is by no means sufficient. In controversial passages, therefore, from which we take very important teachings, we must draw up the necessary proofs for tropes and prove that Scripture used that trope in that very passage.” These are the words of Flaccius Illyricus (Clavis Scripturae, part. 2, p. 283). Rightly, therefore, do some people warn us not to withdraw from the common and most frequently used meaning of a word because of some particular examples, unless the evidence of the text itself compels us to withdraw. Of course, it is one thing to have the possibility of a meaning that is external to the sequence of the passage; it is quite another to have the necessity of a tropological meaning in the same sequence. We should, therefore, not be making up tropes, but finding them in the text. These are useful:
(1) Against the Photinians. In their own writings, when we bring arguments in support of religious orthodoxy, nothing more frequently occurs than this response: “This passage is capable of being taken this way; this word is capable of being understood differently; it is enough that this word allows many different meanings” and so on. See Schmalius (in refutat. thes. D. Frantzii pp. 27 and 312) and Socinus (de Servat. Christo part. 2, ch. 22, etc.). But this is in no way sufficient to prove a trope. For it must be shown, from the evidence of the text itself, not only that it is capable of being understood differently, but also that it ought not to be understood in any other way. Anything that is based on one or two examples from different passages, which are for the most part unrelated and different in genre, cannot be the best reading.
(2) Against the Cinglians. They think that, in order to prove that there is a trope in the word “is” for “signifies,” it is enough to twist some unrelated examples of Scripture. Luther very effectively refutes them saying (tom. 3. Jen. Germ. in praefat. syngramm. fol. 285), “Even if there were an example of this reasoning (that “is” can mean “signify”) in Scripture, nevertheless, that would not thereby prove that it should and must be taken that way also in the words (“this is my body”). This they will never prove. This I know for sure. Because it is very much a different thing, when I say that something can be so, and when I say that it must be so and can be nothing different. One’s conscience can have no confidence in the first, but it can have confidence in the second.” But you can read more on this topic in writings of the theologians concerning the Eucharistic controversies. Compare also Flacius’ chapter on how the tropic speech should be understood (Clavis Scripturae, part 2, ch. Quomodo sit cognoscenda tropica locutio. co. 281 and following).